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Research on subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries has gained momentum 
over the past decade. Most existing studies aim at explaining why and how local strongmen 
managed to survive in some but not other subnational jurisdictions despite a democratization of 
politics at the national level. Focusing on subnational variance in democratization as well as 
trying to understand regime continuity, existing studies rarely consider the possibility that 
subnational authoritarian regimes may continue to exist for different reasons. Available research 
also does not say much about what causes may lead to the breakdown of subnational 
authoritarian regimes. Two new books address these gaps in the current literature on subnational 
authoritarianism.  
 
In Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity 
within Democratic Countries, Augustina Giraudy examines the conditions that allow for the 
continuity of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes (SURs), which are subnational political 
entities in which incumbents prevent opposition candidates from gaining access to state positions 
through undemocratic and informal actions, including electoral fraud and voter intimidation, the 
restriction of civil and political rights and frequent changes in the local electoral and institutional 
framework. Giraudy argues that there are several ways in which SURs may continue after 
countries adopt democratic institutions at the national level. The interaction between national and 
local executive governments provides the key to understanding this variance in SURs continuity. 
Concretely, in democracies in which presidents can wield effective power over (co-partisan or 
opposition) subnational autocrats and have enough leverage to force the latter to cooperate, 
presidents have incentives to strengthen and sustain SURs as such local autocrats are useful allies 
in elections. This power constellation results in SURs reproduction from above. 
 
In contrast, there are subnational autocrats whom national presidents cannot co-opt 
because they lack the powers to do so. Presidents have an incentive to undermine such 
potentially unruly SURs. However, if such local autocrats have the capacity to maintain local 
party elite unity and are supported by the local masses, SURs self-reproduction follows as these 
autocrats successfully fend off presidential attacks from above. If presidential powers to coopt 
SURs are ineffective and local autocrats are incapable of putting together a solid local coalition, 
SURs usually become democratic jurisdictions, Giraudy argues. 
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 Understanding the interaction between national and local players is therefore key in 
isolating the conditions for SURs survival. To this end, Giraudy examines the powers of 
presidents to coopt local autocrats as well as the power of local autocrats to maintain their 
autonomy vis-à-vis presidents.  
 
A combination of fiscal and institutional powers determines the authority of presidents 
over local autocrats. A president’s fiscal powers are high if intergovernmental transfers occur at 
the discretion of the national executive government. A president’s fiscal powers are low if 
transfers between government layers occur automatically and are based on pre-defined formulas. 
Furthermore, presidents yield high fiscal powers if they can easily change the rules for the 
allocation of fiscal resources. Finally, if national tax revenues from which subnational political 
units are excluded are large, the president gains additional fiscal power. 
 
A president enjoys commands over strong partisan powers if the party to which the 
president belongs is highly institutionalized, enjoys high party discipline due to established rules 
and regulations and has a presence in every subnational jurisdiction. Under such conditions, co-
partisans ruling over undemocratic jurisdictions can be coopted through the party apparatus 
while local autocrats affiliated with opposition parties can be threatened through the potential 
mobilization of subnational party branches belonging to the president’s party.  
 
However, to fully understand the authority of presidents, the capacity of subnational 
autocrats to fend off attacks also needs to be taken into account. Again, a combination of fiscal 
and institutional powers determine subnational autocrats’ autonomy vis-à-vis the center. With 
regard to fiscal conditions, the size of local fiscal deficits, levels of indebtedness and the 
possibility to raise taxes at the subnational level define the fiscal autonomy of local autocrats.  If 
local fiscal deficits and indebtedness are high while possibilities to collect local revenues are 
scarce, local autocrats have only weak fiscal powers to resist cooptation from above. Institutional 
conditions that determine the degree to which presidents can co-opt SURs fall into two broad 
categories, namely patrimonial and non-patrimonial state structures. Patrimonial state structures 
exist if the local institutional framework centralizes power in the hands of the local ruler, blurs 
the distinction between public and private interests, generates dependencies that can be exploited 
for political gain and facilitate the use of public resources for private gain. Non-patrimonial local 
state structures, in contrast, limit the power of incumbents, protect the autonomy of societal 
groups when interacting with the state and establish clear rules to distinguish public and private 
goods. Such institutional differences are important as they determine the capacity of local 
autocrats to defend themselves against outside attacks. Patrimonial structures increase the 
propensity of local autocrats to neutralize presidential attacks, while non-patrimonial structures 
make it difficult for local autocrats to control the boundaries to their jurisdictions and neutralize 
cooptation attempts from above. In short, “a combination of national and subnational variables 
need to be present in order for presidents to wield effective power over SURs/ autocrats,” so 
Giraudy (p. 26). 
 
This combination of national and subnational variables results in subnational autocrats 
whom presidents can easily coopt and others who are relatively more autonomous. Local 
autocrats who enjoy comparatively high levels of autonomy vis-à-vis national presidents pose a 
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potential threat to national leaders who therefore seek to oust them from power. However, unruly 
local autocrats who manage to impose party discipline and elicit the support of the masses will 
survive national efforts to undermine their rule.  
 
To test her theory, Giraudy examines SURs continuity in Argentina and Mexico and finds 
that the combination of fiscal and institutional conditions at the national and subnational level 
has led to SURs reproduction from above as well as SURs self-reproduction in both countries. 
However, Argentinian presidents enjoy greater fiscal powers than their Mexican counterparts, 
while the Peronist Partido Justicialista in Argentina is weakly institutionalized and party 
discipline is low. Mexico differs from Argentina as the Partido Acción Nacional presidential 
party in power during the period examined in the book under review here was comparatively 
more institutionalized. Therefore, fiscal conditions at the national and local level play more of a 
role in the continuity of SURs in Argentina while partisan structures are comparatively more 
consequential for SURs durability in Mexico.   
 
The main findings presented in Giraudy’s book, namely that there are different pathways 
to SURs continuity both between and within countries and that these pathways are determined by 
the capacity of presidents to co-opt local autocrats challenge existing research on subnational 
authoritarianism in several ways:  
 
Giraudy contributes to and expands existing works that place institutions and 
intergovernmental relations at the center of their analysis by challenging previous research that 
locate the causes for SURs continuity at the subnational level, such as Edward Gibson’s 
argument in “Boundary control” which says that local autocrats prevail if they manage to close 
the boundary to their authoritarian jurisdiction by preventing opposition forces access to outside 
allies and resources.
i
 Giraudy’s research suggests that SURs continuity is possible even if local 
autocrats fail to close boundaries to their jurisdictions because presidents may lack the powers to 
take advantage of such openings. There may therefore be different reasons within the same 
country for why SURs survive, a possibility that previous studies such as Gibson’s do not 
consider. 
 
However, Giraudy argument is mainly aimed against scholars who see subnational 
authoritarianism as a product of local conditions. Following Edward Gibson’s institution-centric 
theory of subnational authoritarianism, she argues that SURs are decisively nonlocal in origins 
and the result of complex processes between different institutional layers. Giraudy takes issue 
with claims made in previous research that “SUR continuity is determined by geographic 
location, cultural heritage, and levels of socioeconomic development” (p. 11). SURs are spread 
across the territories of Argentina and Mexico and are also by no means confined to destitute 
areas where patronage structures are endemic. While non-patrimonial structures make it almost 
impossible for local autocrats to centralize authority and subsequently to cordon off their 
jurisdiction from outside attacks, such SURs continue to exist if presidents lack the power to co-
opt them.  
 
 It is with regard to her book’s main critique of scholarship which emphasizes the 
importance of conditions intrinsic to authoritarian enclaves for SURs continuity that Giraudy’s 
argument is most problematic. While SURs reproduction from above may indeed be the result of 
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a combination of institutional conditions found at different administrative layers, it is difficult to 
see why cases of SURs self-reproduction should not depend on factors exogenous to institutions.  
Giraudy never clearly explains how relatively autonomous local autocrats establish party 
cohesion and generate mass support. As Angelo Panebianco (1988, 20) showed, party internal 
power dynamics are “strictly conditioned by the relations that the party establishes in the genetic 
phases and after by its interactions with other organizations and societal institutions.’’ For 
instance, the class in which a party is rooted may determine party internal dynamics for decades. 
Working class parties are more likely to develop strong vertical structures under the control of a 
national party leadership than middle class parties, Panebianco showed. Consequently, working 
class parties not only enjoy higher party discipline but are internal power structures are also often 
tilted in favor of national party leaders. The point is that socio-economic differences between and 
within countries may shape power dynamics both between and within parties and therefore 
eventually the capacity of relatively autonomous local autocrats to resist attacks from above. 
Characteristics intrinsic to localities may also shape the ability of local autocrats to elicit mass 
support. While SURs exist in jurisdictions with patrimonial and non-patrimonial structures in 
both Argentina and Mexico, patrimonial structures increase the propensity of local autocrats to 
neutralize presidential attacks and engage in SUR self-reproduction if presidential powers are 
weak, Giraudy argued above. Since socio-economic characteristics increase the probability that 
patrimonial structures exist, the logic conclusion is that external factors must shape local 
autocrats capacity of SUR self-reproduction. Finally, Giraudy’s argument that autocrats that are 
able to elicit mass support are more likely to neutralize presidential attempts to oust them from 
power also contradicts her claim that the roots of SURs continuity have all to do with 
institutional context, not with factors intrinsic to localities. “To elicit political support from the 
masses, subnational autocrats must implement policies and programs that are popular among 
voters….It does not matter whether SUR incumbents distribute public goods programmatically 
among the local population or whether they dispense clientelistic handouts. What is relevant is 
that incumbents in SURs are forced to deliver goods so as to give citizens a vested interest in the 
perpetuation of the regime.” (p. 31). However, “the masses” are not a homogenous group but 
consist of different classes with different interests, which has important consequences for the 
propensity of local politicians to elicit mass support as a new book on Argentine local politics by 
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro shows. 
 
 The starting point of Weitz-Shapiro’s Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, 
Poverty, and Social Policy are, again, variances in undemocratic practices in Argentina’s local 
politics. However, unlike Giraudy who is interested in explaining regime continuity, Weitz-
Shapiro wants to understand under what conditions local strongmen embark upon more 
democratic forms of politics. Focusing on clientelism, one of many undemocratic practices in 
Argentine local politics, she argues that engaging in such practices may not always be beneficial 
for politicians. In jurisdictions in which political competition is high and where there is a 
sizeable middle class, engaging in clientelism will have “audience costs” that outweigh the 
benefits to engage in such practices.  
 
Weitz-Shapiro argues that middle-class voters condemn clientelism because they see it as 
an indicator for the poor quality of government service delivery more broadly. Service delivery 
motivated by clientelism may not only distort the welfare of this group but clientelism also 
usually requires politicians to spend most of their time in personal interactions with voters rather 
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than spending their time on public policy programs. The opportunity costs this personalization of 
politics creates for middle class voters is the reason for why they reject clientelism. In addition, 
middle-class voters may reject clientelism on moral grounds. Overall, Weitz-Shapiro’s 
assumption is that middle-class voters have fewer incentives to support clientelism and that they 
will use elections to punish politicians engaging in such practices.  
 
The findings presented by Weitz-Shapiro suggest that Schumpeterian views of 
democracy, which claim that increasing competition will curb clientelism, are at best incomplete. 
Intense competition among electoral candidates alone is insufficient to reduce the individualized 
exchange of goods for political support. In fact, if poor voters comprise the majority of the local 
electorate, an intensification of political competition may actually increase clientelist practices. 
Likewise, the argument put forward by Weitz-Shapiro also challenges modernization theory’s 
main claim that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain a democracy. 
If politicians are relatively insulated from the electorate due to a lack of electoral competition, 
middle class voters won’t be able to exert pressure on politicians to opt out of clientelism. In 
short, a growing middle class steers politicians in more democratic direction only in combination 
with political competition. 
 
 To explain why the reliance on clientelistic practices by politicians varies across 
Argentina’s municipalities, Weitz-Shapiro examines the country’s largest Food Security Policy, 
the Programa Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria (PNSA), which distributes food boxes to 
destitute citizens. Based on an original survey about such practices conducted in 125 
municipalities, Weitz-Shapiro finds that citizen-politician engagement varies across Argentina 
because “politicians’ decision about whether to use clientelism reflect the practices’ relative 
electoral costs and incumbents’ perceived security in office at a given point in time” (p. 107). 
 
 Weitz-Shapiro’s book is an important contribution to the study of subnational politics 
because the potential costs clientelism may have for politicians are rarely analyzed. Most studies 
on local politics focus on the benefits such practices yield for politicians. More important, her 
findings challenge theories which say that institutional characteristics determine clientelist 
practices. Argentina’s federal system does not allow for “substantial subnational institutional 
experimentation” (p. 15), yet, despite this relative institutional homogeneity, levels of clientelism 
vary across the country. Likewise, Weitz-Shapiro also argues against theories put forward by 
neoliberal scholars that have linked the prevalence of clientelism to the size of the state in the 
(local) economy. Her data do not reveal any link between control of the local economy by the 
state and the prevalence of clientelistic practices. Finally, Weitz-Shapiro also criticizes neo-
Tocquevillian perspectives that see political accountability as a function of “strong” civil society 
engagement in politics. Based on her empirical data, the author argues that the presence of strong 
horizontal links in society without political competition among politicians is unlikely to lead 
towards more accountability.   
 
However, while Weitz-Shapiro shows that electoral support in competitive political 
systems depends on social structure and that not all voters have the same incentives to support 
local autocrats, thereby exposing the simplistic understanding of “mass support” put forward in 
Giraudy’s argument on SURs self-reproduction, it would have been interesting to hear more 
about what factors determine levels of political competition in Argentine municipalities. While 
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Weitz-Shapiro goes to great length to show that clientelism does not influence levels of political 
competition (but rather, competition in combination with relatively affluent voters influences 
clientelism), she does not put forward any argument as to what determines competition in the 
first place. Arguably, the competition between politicians or the absence thereof, has its roots in 
structural factors including local economic conditions and the opportunities they present to local 
elites for accumulating and monopolizing resources.
ii
 Likewise, structural conditions may shape 
the independence of the electorate vis-à-vis politicians and therefore their willingness to punish 
them at the ballot box. Most important, Weitz-Shapiro’s main premise, namely that middle-class 
voters reject clientelistic practices for moral and economic reasons, sits oddly with existing 
works that showed that it is not so much the presence of middle class voters that matters but their 
position vis-à-vis the government and political elites that determines whether they push for 
democracy or not. For instance, Weitz-Shapiro does not discuss Barrington Moore’s classic 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy that showed how in many countries different 
modes of development created middle classes that depend on the state and became authoritarian 
deadweights rather than a bulwark for democracy as a consequence.
iii
 Likewise, socio-economic 
development may not only influence the position of middle class voters vis-à-vis the state but 
also shape the relationship of less affluent voters to the state. The “economic autonomy” of 
voters, poor or rich, determines whether politicians have anything to gain politically from 
engaging in clientelism and therefore whether they engage in such practices in the first place, as 
recent studies have shown.
iv
  
 
Even if one were to disregard such studies that emphasize the importance of structural factors 
in creating different electorates and eventually the propensity of different electorates to shun or 
engage in clientelistic practices, Weitz-Shapiro’s theory takes the composition of the local 
electorate as a given. Numerous studies in recent years have shown, however, that clientelism in 
itself shapes the composition of the electorate. The Curley-effect in Boston, where four-times 
mayor James Michael Curley actively shaped the electorate in his favor by channeling resources 
to poor Irish voters and thereby triggering an exodus of richer citizens from the city is only the 
most infamous example.
v
 
 
Overall, institution-centric theories of local authoritarianism ought to develop a more 
sophisticated concept of “local conditions”, especially if they want to rule them out as 
explanatory factors. While absolute levels of poverty or “local cultures” (however defined) may 
indeed fail to explain the variance in SURs continuity both between and within countries, class 
formation and the political dynamics that ensue from it ought to at least complement institutional 
approaches to the study of SURs. While studies such as Weitz-Shapiro’s book are a step in the 
right direction, they too could make a better use of the rich literature on how structural 
conditions exogenous to local institutions shape local political machines and the clientelistic 
practices on which their survival depends. 
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